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Offsetting Programs: Struggling to Find
an Equitable Solution Internationally
by Silvia Fejka*

C

arbon offsetting can have some laudable goals, including
protection of the most pristine resources left on earth.1
As a category, however, carbon offsetting and markets
are inappropriate international solutions to climate change and
environmental degradation. The two current carbon offsetting
mechanisms have dubious environmental value and maintain
destructive behavior rather than addressing current emissions.
Climate change is an example of a collective action problem,
where benefits are diffuse, creating little incentive for individual nations to act. This renders carbon offsetting programs
particularly susceptible to free riders.2 Further, carbon offset
loopholes weaken equitability in international negotiations and
allow developed nations to perpetuate wasteful behavior nationally.3 Although critics have discussed these problems for years,
carbon offsetting programs continue in full force.4 A solution to
the problems of inequity and the lack of collective action in the
current scheme is to create a system of international obligations
that also allows each country to achieve these goals within its
own unique context.
Two prevalent types of carbon offsetting mechanisms exist:
project-based offsets and carbon markets.5 In the former case,
parties pay for-profit firms or nongovernmental organizations6
that engage in carbon offsetting activities, such as reforestation
or efficient energy.7 Individuals use these offsetting services
at their own discretion.8 The project-based carbon offsetting
market is expansive and one can offset virtually anything, from
driving to eating.9 The second model is increasingly common;
industry traders, states, or countries participate in a carbon trading market to meet reduction goals imposed through regulation.
Examples include the international offsetting scheme under the
Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”)
under the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate
Change,10 and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the
United States.11 Similar mechanisms exist for offsetting different
pollutants as well.12 These mechanisms effectively create a right
to pollute that can be bought and sold as a commodity.13
Critics of carbon offsetting point to its scientific unreliability and questionable environmental value.14 Carbon markets
alone do not reduce overall global carbon emissions, even at full
efficiency.15 The calculation of the reduction of carbon emissions
is based on uncertain projections and misevaluation of natural
resources.16 The dubious environmental value of carbon offsetting also stems from its nature as an ex post solution that does
not reduce consumption or the behaviors causing the harm.17
Carbon offsetting is more susceptible to this critique than
carbon markets, which may attempt to create systemic change,
but markets also contribute to the polluting behavior for which
38

they create a market, through the commoditization of a right
to pollute.18 Essentially, offsetting schemes skirt the need for
wider, structural change and an economy that does not depend
on carbon consumption.19
On an international scale, the need to allocate responsibility
for environmental degradation magnifies the disadvantages of
carbon offsetting. Offsetting carbon emissions reallocates the
burden to change behaviors between nations.20 Offsetting often
perpetuates environmentally detrimental behavior in developed
countries, and forces developing countries to either accommodate for less consumption or change behaviors on industrial and
individual levels.21 Environmental justice arguments against
offsetting encompass this issue and raise the fact that poor
communities are disproportionately affected by environmental
degradation and climate change.22 This is not to say that developing countries may disregard sustainability, but rather that all
countries, especially those with carbon-based economies, should
shoulder their respective burdens based upon their unique
circumstances.
The attempts of nations to reallocate their burdens reflect
that climate change is a classic collective action problem.23
This means that an international forum is absolutely necessary
because, in the climate change context, all nations benefit from
a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions whether or not they
assume the costs of that reduction.24 Carbon free riders are a
problem particularly in the CDM and Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries
(“REDD”) programs.25 Although offsetting itself is technically
not “free” riding, its “business as usual” approach demonstrates
minimal effort in addressing the problem.26
This free riding problem explains the insufficiencies of
current international climate change negotiations, such as the
November 2011 Durban Conference.27 Without other incentives,
developed countries, including the United States, may hesitate
to act because climate change mostly affects the impoverished
and its benefits are diffuse.28 This may be why Durban delegates
failed to commit their countries to a binding plan.29 Even more
importantly, Durban negotiators seemed to have expanded
carbon trading mechanisms that could further exacerbate the
problem of “free” riders who may choose to buy credits instead
of changing their own carbon-emitting ways. 30 The results
of Durban show the need for a new international approach that
creates obligations to promote internal changes in consumption
and behavior without offset loopholes.
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Nations must recognize that while offsets can preserve
existing ecosystems and promote sustainable energy projects
that benefit local populations, they merely allow developed
countries to continue polluting at their given rate and prevent the
realization of an equitable solution to the collective action problem of climate change. Although the Kyoto Protocol allows for
lesser burdens on developing countries,31 developed countries
continue to find offset loopholes for their own commitments

through CDM.32 Developed nations should contribute to these
efforts separately from their own reduction obligations, such
as through the recently implemented Green Climate Fund. 33
The global issue of climate change requires both a concerted
international effort and strong national action to move away
from carbon-based economies and effectively address climate
change.
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